Belief Inhibition during Thinking: Not So Fast

Abstract

The present study is a replication of De Neys & Franssens (2009) study about the role of belief inhibition and the nature of inhibition failure. We examined the accessibility of cued beliefs after syllogistic reasoning, using the two-response task and lexical access and more strictly controlled experimental design. We presented participants (N = 78) with conflict and non-conflict categorical syllogisms, and lexical decision tasks comprising of cued and unrelated words. Mean reaction time (RT) was shorter to cued than to unrelated words, both regardless of and taking into account accuracy on the preceding syllogism, and this remained after syllogism congruency was introduced as a factor. RTs for cued words by incongruent syllogisms were shorter after correct than after incorrect evaluation. The successfully conducted Type 2 reasoning enhances lexical access to the cued content, rather than impairs it. Imposed methodological restrictions improved the proposed method, and findings support De Neys’s notion that people are „far more logical“ than presumed.